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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the least frequently used, yet most troublesome remnants 
of the Reconstruction Civil Rights legislation is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 1 
This provision has been troublesome not only to litigants but to the 
courts because of the questions raised and not fully answered about 
Section 1985(3)'s constitutional basis and the need for some state in-
volvement in the challenged action.2 In addition, modern litigants 
have raised questions about the types of violations that can be reme-
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I. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
[If] two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of deprivmg, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of 
equal pnvileges and immunities under the laws; ... the party so injured or deprived 
may have 3:n action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depri· 
vauon, agamst any one or more of the conspuators. 
Although the language of the section has remained the same, it was codified in the 1970 United 
States Code as§ 1985(3), in the 1976 United States Code as§ 1985(c) but it has appeared in all 
subsequent supplements as§ 1985(3). This article will use the designation§ 1985(3). 
2. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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died by the provisions. 3 
Section 1985(3) originally was enacted as part of the Ku Klux 
Act of 1871,4 along with its more frequently used companion, section 
1983.5 However, section 1983 was designed to provide a civil rem-
edy for civil rights violations suffered at the hands of persons "acting 
under color of state law," whereas section 1985(3) was designed to 
provide civil remedies for damage suffered as a result of private con-
spiracies to deprive civil rights.6 Section 1985(3) laid dormant for 
almost ninety years until the United States Supreme Court in Collins 
v. Hardyman held that the statute reached only conspiracies con-
ducted under state law.7 Collins in effect prohibited the use of sec-
3. See i'!fra note 8 and accompanying text. 
4. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. For a discussion of the political environment surrounding the 
Act's passage see Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Irs Original Purpose, 
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 402, (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Construction of Section 
1985(3)]. 
S. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1976). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, 
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privilejleS, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party mjured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
Both sections 1983 and 1985(3) were originally enacted as sections one and two respec-
tively of the Ku Klux Act, Act of Apr. 20, 1871. However, section 1983 following the 1961 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Piipe, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), has been used to chal-
lenge a variety of state practices probably not foreseen by the drafters of the provision. See, 
e.g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980). 
6. Section 1983's statutory language indicates that it was directed at state action resulting 
in "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws 
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1976). The "under color oflaw" language of section 1983 
has been construed to require some state action. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Section 
1985(3), on the other hand, contains no such language. It is directed at conspiracies by private 
persons that aim to deprive an individual of "equal protection of the laws or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
The Court has consistently held that Congress cannot reach private discriminatory con-
duct through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 
163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501 (1946); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Thus, it is necessary to first deter-
mine the extent to which Congress can provide civil remedies for private interference with 
constitutional rights before the statutory reaches of section 1985(3) can be determined. 
7. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Petitioners, members of a political club, 
sued the respondents, private citizens, under section 1985(3) asserting that respondents con-
spired to disrupt petitioners' political meeting because respondents opposed petitioners' polit-
ical views. The Supreme Court held that petitioners had failed to state a cause of action under 
section 1985(3) since there was no allegation that respondents were "acting under color of state 
law." Id at 661. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance 
of the phrase "under color of state law." 
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tion 1985(3) to remedy purely private discrimination. 
Twenty years after Collins the United States Supreme Court in 
Gr!ffin v. Breckenridge held that state action was not needed to re-
cover under section 1985(3).8 However, the Court did not com-
pletely repudiate its decision in Collins. Upon close inspection, 
Gr!ffin really qualified rather than overruled Collins by holding that 
state action was not necessary where the constitutional authority as-
serted was a provision other than the fourteenth amendment.9 Sub-
sequently, the United States Supreme Court in Great American 
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny found that section 
1985(3) was remedial in nature and not as broad in scope as its com-
panion provision section 1983. 10 
8. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Griffin, black citizens of Mississippi 
filed a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), charging that respondents, white citizens of 
Mississippi, had conspired to assault petitioners and to prevent them through force, violence 
and intimidation, from freely traveling upon federal, state, and local highways. The Court 
held that § 1985(3) does not require state action but reaches private conspiracies that are 
aimed at an invidiously discriminatory deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured to 
all by law. ld at 95-103. 
9. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97. Note also what the Gr(ffin Court said regarding Collins: 
Whether or not Collins was correctly decided on its own facts is a question with 
which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light of the evolution of 
decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of 
the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist. 
ld at 95-96. 
The Court in Gr(ffin based its ruling on the thirteenth amendment and the right of interstate 
travel implied in the Constitution. ld at 105-06. But if Justice Blackmun's dissent in United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352-66 n.l3 (1983). Justice Black-
mun asserted that Griffin clearly repudiates the notion that state action may be required in 
some section 1985(3) actions. The specific language referred to reads: 
An element of the cause of action established by the first section (of the Act of 1871 ), 
now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is that the deprivation complained of must have been inflicted 
under color of state law. To read any such requ1rement into § 1985(3) would thus 
deprive that section of all its independent effect. (footnote omitted). 
ld at 99. 
The Supreme Court has always maintained, since its decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883) that state action must be asserted to state a cognizable action under the four-
teenth amendment. See supra note 6. Thus, if some constitutional source of authority other 
than the fourteenth amendment could be used to legitimatize section 1985(3), the state action 
requirement could be avoided. This result would enable litigants to reach conspiracies by 
private persons that if committed by government would violate an individual's civil rights. 
10. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 
(1979). In Novotny, the respondent, a white male loan officer and member of the board of 
directors of Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association, sued the Association and 
its directors alleging that the Association had intentionally denied its women employees equal 
employment opportunities. Respondent claimed that he was fired because he expressed sup-
port for the women employees at a board of directors meeting. He claimed his termination 
violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ( 1976). Novotny also claimed damages under section 
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However, Collins, Gr(ffin and Novotny leave several questions 
about section 1985(3) unanswered. First, the Court in Gr(ffin and 
Novotny stated that there might be other constitutional sources of 
congressional authority to support enactment of section 1985(3) be-
1985(3) asserting that he had been injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal 
protection and privileges and immunities under the laws. 
The Supreme Court held that although section 1985(3) was remedial, Title VII cannot be 
used as the source of the substantive right asserted under§ 1985(3) because Title VII contains 
its own remedial provisions. "[Section 1985(3)] creates no rights. It is a purely remedial stat-
ute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right-to equal 
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws-is breached by a 
conspiracy in the manner defined by the section." Novotny, 422 U.S. at 376. 
The significance of designating § 1985(3) as a remedial as opposed to a substantive statute 
is that with a substantive statute plaintiffs need only allege a deprivation of those rights guar-
anteed under § 1985(3), whereas use of a remedial statute requires that plaintiffs identify some 
independent substantive right the denial of which can be remedied by use of a statute like 
§ 1985(3). Since most substantive statutes also include remedies for their denial, the Court in 
Novotny by classifying§ 1985(3) as remedial, drastically limited its potential use as a means of 
checking private conspiracies to deprive civil rights. 
In an earlier article the author questioned the correctness of this conclusion in light of the 
questionable support provided by the legislative history of the 1871 Act and the fact that only 
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion attempted to infer that the legislative history supports 
the majority's conclusion. See Novotny, at 382 n.l. See also Banks, The Scope of Section 
1985(1) "in Light o.f Great American Savings and Loan v. Novotny: Too Lillie Too Late?", 9 
HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 579, 585-59 ( 1982). This point merits reconsideration here in light of 
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Scoll, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 3361 (1983). Justice Black-
mun, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan and O'Connor suggests that the Court's statement 
in Novotny as to section 1985(3)'s remedial nature, while accurate in that case's context, does 
not necessarily preclude an action where there is no violation of an independent substantive 
legal right. See Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3362, 3365 n.IO. Justice Blackmun suggests that section 
1985(3) is unique, like traditional conspiracy statutes, which cannot be characterized as either 
purely substantive or remedial. See Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3365 n. 10 ctiing Note. Private Conspira-
cies to Violate Civil Rights: The Scope o.f Section 1985(3) Afier Great American Federal Savings 
and Loan Association v. Novotny, 61 B.U.L. REv. 1007, 1021 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Pri-
vate Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights). It should be noted that the dissenters in Novotny, 
Justices White, Brennan and Marshall, also rejected the majority's conclusion that section 
1985(3) was remedial, although Justice White's argument while somewhat ingenious is at times 
tenuous. See Novorny, 442 U.S. at 385. Justice Blackmun's reasoning more logically explains 
how a statute whose language sounds remedial can have substantive qualities and nevertheless 
have its use with another substantive statute or right reconciled. This point is discussed at 
length in Section IV, in.fra. 
The Court in Griffin set forth the requirements of a conspiracy that would be actionable 
under§ 1985(3). The conspiracy must: (I) involve "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 
invidiously discriminatory animus" which is the basis of the conspirator's action; and (2) be 
"aim[ed) at the deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." See 
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 
Section 1983 on the other hand by virtue of its broader statutory language has been held 
to remedy violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional laws. See Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I, 4-8 ( 1980). In Thiboutot the Court concluded that the phrase "and 
laws" in § 1983 "means what it says," and thus applies to a broad range oflaws, including in 
that instance the Social Security Act. /d. 
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sides the fourteenth and thirteenth amendments. 11 Since the primary 
obstacle to greater use of section 1985(3) is the question about the 
source of Congress' authority to regulate discriminatory acts by non-
governmental persons, it is important to determine whether some 
other constitutional basis can be found that gives Congress such au-
thority and whether it can be successfully asserted that the drafters 
of section 1985(3) intended to rely on some constitutional basis other 
than the fourteenth amendment. Secondly, the Court in Novotny 
while holding section 1985(3) was remedial in nature did not indi-
cate what substantive rights, if any were secured by the provision. 12 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine the post Novotny 
cases to determine the extent and degree to which they clarify the 
unanswered questions about section 1985(3)'s scope and "constitu-
tional periphery." This article will attempt to do so paying particu-
lar attention to the Court's most recent decision involving section 
1985(3), United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott} 3 
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: A REMEDY FOR PRIVATE 
DISCRIMINATION? 
Since Novotny 14 there has been only one reported case that has 
sought to use some constitutional basis to invoke section 1985(3) 
remedies other than the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments or 
the right of interstate travel. That case is United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott. 15 In Scott, a non-unionized construe-
II. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02. The Court in Griffin stated that it was not going to deter-
mine at the juncture this "constitutionally permissible periphery" of§ 1985(3). ld, at 107; 
Novotny, 442 U.S. at 370-78. 
12. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375. Nevertheless, there was some discussion by several mem-
bers of the Court on this point. Justice Powell argued that section 1985(3) was limited to 
remedying violations of"those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution." 442 U.S. at 
379 (Powell, J ., concurring), whereas Justice Stevens contended that section 1985{3) was not 
"intended to provide a remedy for violation of statutory rights-let alone rights created by 
statutes that had not yet been enacted [at the time of 1871) .... " /d. at 385 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). But if. Justice White's statement that "(Section 1985(3)) encompasses all rights 
guaranteed in federal statutes as well as those rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution." 
See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 389 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
13. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). 
14. See supra note 10. 
15. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E. D. Tex. 1978), affd in part & rev'd in part, 640 
F.2d 708, reh'g en bane granted, 656 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part & rev'd in part, 680 
F.2d 979 (5th Cir. l982),subnom. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. 
Ct. 3352 ( 1983). 
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tion company, located in a right to work state, 16 hired employees 
without regard to union membership. Local residents became dis-
turbed over the hiring of non-union employees and ultimately vio-
lence erupted. 17 The residents threatened to continue the violence as 
long as the company employed non-union persons. As a result of the 
violence and accompanying vandalism, the company defaulted on its 
contract. 18 The company and two employees beaten during the vio-
lence sued both the union and various named individuals asserting 
that the defendants illegally conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their 
legally protected rights under section 1985(3). Specifically, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive them of 
equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities 
under the law when defendants planned and carried out an attack on 
the company's construction site, assaulting workers and destroying 
property. 19 
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a temporary injunction re-
straining defendants from conspiring to commit further acts of vio-
lence or intimidation against employees at the construction 
company's pump station site. 20 The defendants claimed that the dis-
trict court lacked the power to issue the injunction requested because 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act21 deprived "the court of jurisdiction to 
enjoin labor unions from engaging in conspiratorial conduct."22 The 
district court, claiming to apply the four elements set forth in Grif-
fin ,23 concluded that there has been a conspiracy to harm the non-
unionized employees of a non-unionized company and since the 
conspiracy violated both state civil and criminal laws, section 
16. Texas law prohibits so called closed shops where union membership is a condition of 
hiring and/or continued employment. 
17. Scolf, 103 S. Ct. at 3355. 
18. ld The company, A.A. Cross Construction Company had contracted with the De-
partment of the Army to construct a pumping station and gravity drainage structure on the 
Taylor Bayou Hurricane Leave near Port Arthur, Texas. ld 
19. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. 1982). 
20. Id at 984. 
21. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
22. Scoll v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 985. 
23. The Court in Gr[ffin ruled that section 1985(3) plaintiffs must plead and prove four 
elements: (I) existence of a conspiracy; (2) the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive plain-
tiffs, either directly or indirectly, as a class of the equal protection of the laws or equal privi-
leges and immunities under the law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 
(4) resultant personal or property injury or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of 
the United States. 403 U.S. at I 02-03. 
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1985(3) afforded a proper remedy. 24 In so ruling the district court 
found that the class of non-union employees and employers fell 
within those protected classes covered by section 1985(3).25 Further, 
the court found that the plaintiffs' constitutional right of association 
had been violated.26 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en 
bane, affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the 
purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive plaintiffs of their first 
24. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 228 (E.D. Tex. 1978). The district court also relied 
on McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane) which 
held that a private person could deprive another of equal protection of the laws only when the 
defendant acted in violation of a state or federal provision. /d. at 933. Thus, the district court 
found that § 1985(3) was being invoked to remedy a violation of the first amendment guaran-
tee·of freedom of association. Although this amendment normally applies only against gov-
ernments, it was applied to the private individuals in Scolt because the defendants' actions 
violated state and federal laws thus constituting an "independent illegality" resulting in a dep-
rivation of plaintiffs rights of equal protection of the law. /d. at 228. 
The doctrine of "independent illegality" developed from McLellan where the court in 
denying relief under section 1985(3) to a plaintiff discharged from employment because he 
filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy stated that a private individual could deprive another 
of equal protection of the laws only by an illegal action. McLellan, 545 F.2d at 925. In Scott 
the illegal acts were the physical assaults and destruction of property, and criminal acts under 
state law. Thus the defendants' conduct was unlawful and independent of the section 1985(3) 
violation (freedom of association). See Scott v_ Moore, 680 F.2d at 982-88. 
25. See Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. at 229-30. Section 1985(3) has not been limited to 
racial discrimination, however, courts require that the plaintiff be victimized as a member of a 
particular class rather than as an individual. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480, 481 
(6th Cir. 1972) (no protection for individual teacher whose contract was not renewed); Doyle v. 
Unicare Health Servs., 399 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1975), q(J'd without opinion, 541 F.2d 283 
(7th Cir. 1976) (health care institution did not discriminate on a class basis against mentally 
retarded patient); Schoonfield v. Mayor & City Council, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1085 (D. Md. 
1975), a.IJ'd without opinion, 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1976) (no class-based discrimination in-
volved in firing of jail warden). 
Lower courts have found the following classes protected by section 1985(3): (I) religious 
groups, Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227-32 (8th Cir. 1971) (white catholics); Baer v. Baer, 450 
F. Supp. 481, 490-91 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (members of the Unification Church); and (2) political 
and/or social protest groups, Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 215, vacated as 
moot, 501 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (environmentalists); Glasson v. City of Louis-
ville, 518 F.2d 899, 911 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (political protestors); Cam-
eron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (supporters of a political candidate); 
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971) (white civil rights supporters); Local I 
(ACA), Broadcast Employees of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 266-77 (E. D. Pa. 1976) (members of a local union); Brown v. Villanova 
Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (E. D. Pa. 1974) (student protest group); Franceschina v. Has-
sle, 331 F. Supp. 833, 838-39 (S.D. Ind. 1972) (migrant farm workers); Folqueras v. Morgan, 
346 F. Supp. 615, 625 (W.O. Mich. 1971) (migrant farm organizers). 
26. Scou v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. at 230. "this Court believes that men and women have 
the right to associate or not to associate with any group or class of individuals, and concomi-
tantly, to be free of violent acts against their bodies and property because of such association 
or non-association." /d. 
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amendment right not to associate with a union.27 The court of ap-
peals rejected the argument that absent some proof of state action 
there could be no infringement of first amendment rights. 28 The 
court of appeals went even further holding that section 1985(3) 
reached conspiracies motivated by either political or economic bias, 
finding congressional authority to regulate such behavior in the 
Commerce Clause.29 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari30 and re-
versed holding in a 5 to 4 decision that section 1985(3), absent some 
proof of state action, does not prohibit private conspiracies to 
abridge the right of association guaranteed by the first amendment.31 
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, author of the dis-
senting opinion in Novotny, while conceding that the Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate private conspiracies, 
concluded that since section 1985(3) is remedial and the substantive 
right invoked-the first amendment-restrains only governmental 
action, reliance on the Commerce Clause is inappropriate here.32 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the four dissenting justices, admitted 
that under the Commerce Clause Congress has the power to ban pri-
vate conspiracies, but he found it unnecessary to address whether the 
Commerce Clause could be used as a: constitutional basis for section 
1985(3) suits.33 Instead, Justice Blackmun's dissent is based on the 
proposition that the drafters of section 1985(3) believed that the 
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment were intended to apply 
27. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 1004 (5th Cir. 1982). The court did set aside four judg-
ments rendered without proof against eight of the eleven unions concluding that there was 
insufficient evidence of participation by them in the conspiracy. Id 
28. Jd at 988-89. But see Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 1004 (Rubin and Williams, JJ., 
joined by Brown, Vance, Kravitch, Randle, Tate and Johnson, JJ., dissenting); Id, at 1022 
(Anderson, J., dissenting); Id (Garwood, J., dissenting). 
29. Id at 990-96. 
30. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1982). 
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The Court also held that section 1985(3) 
does not reach conspiracies "motivated by economic or commercial animus." Id at 3360. The 
Court in explaining this statement referred to anti-union, anti non-union and anti-employer 
bias. I d at 3361. 
It should be noted that Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Novotny suggested that 
the commerce clause could provide a constitutional basis for a § 1985(3) action to remedy 
discriminatory conspiracies to deny Title VII rights. 442 U.S. at 396 n.20. 
32. Scoll, I 03 S. Ct. at 3358. 
33. Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3366 n.14. (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and 
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). 
HeinOnline -- 27 Howard L.J. 1505 1984
1984) PERMISSIBLE PERIPHERY OF SECTION 1985(3) 1505 
against both public and private actors34 and accordingly, since the 
first amendment guarantee of freedom of association has been incor-
porated into the fourteenth amendment, 35 no state action is neces-
sary in a section 1985(3) suit. 36 
The Court's reluctance to use the Commerce Clause as one of 
the constitutional bases for section 1985(3) is understandable. 
Whereas the public accomodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act37 evidenced a clear legislative intent that the Commerce Clause 
should be the source of congressional authority to regulate the pri-
vate conduct covered by the Act. 38 In 1871 when section 1985(3) was 
enacted, the Commerce Clause was not deemed to be nearly as po-
tent and extensive as it had become by 1964.39 While this fact in 
itself should not be dispositive of the issue, it also seems fairly clear 
that the drafters of section 1985(3) did not rely on the Commerce 
Clause as a basis for their exercise of authority.40 Thus, the majority 
34. ld at 3363. 
35. Fiske v. Kansas. 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
36. Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3362-66. Properly interpreted, § 1985(3) prohibits private conspir-
acies designed to interfere with a person's equal enjoyment and exercise of their civil rights 
even if those conspiracies have no state involvement of any kind. Jd at 3366. 
37. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a(6). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964), was the first modern comprehensive civil rights law covering, among 
other things, public accomodations, voting, school desegregation and discrimination in em-
ployment. This Act was followed by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and the 
1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976) (fair housing, indian rights, civil obedience and 
voting). 
38. See, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964). 
39. See, e.g., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1973) enacted in 1890 pursuant 
to Congress' power to regulate commerce, was a piece of economic legislation. As the Court's 
decision in California v. Central Pacific, 127 U.S. I (1888) and Roberts v. Northern Pacific, 
158 U.S. I (1894) indicate, the regulation contemplated during the late 1800's, invoking Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce was economic and not politically or racially based. See also 
Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 1019-20 (Rubin, J., dissenting). 
40. Judge Clark, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in his majority 
opinion in Sco/1 argued that the original drafters of § 1985(3) implied that an alternative 
source of Congressional authority for the section may be found in the commerce clause. See 
680 F.2d at 997. However, this position is weak since Judge Clark could find little legislative 
history to support this proposition. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st sess. 81 (1871). 
Senator Bingham states: "It was always competent for the United States by law to enforce 
every affirmative grant of power." (cited inSco/1 by Judge Clark in support of his proposition). 
Circuit Judges Rubin and Williams in their dissent in Scot/ point out that the Ku Klux Act 
"does not invoke the commerce clause, nor does it distinguish between conspiracies that affect 
interstate commerce and those whose aim is solely intrastate." Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 
1019. The dissenters go on to state that: 
[t]he debates of the 1871 Congress focused on the constitutional power of Congress 
under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments . . . . The Forty-Sec-
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faced with a century of case law requiring state action in cases rely-
ing on the fourteenth amendment41 logically concluded that, based 
on the facts in Scott, state action was required.42 
What the majority fails to do, as Justice Blackmun points out, is 
to reconcile this conclusion with their statement in Gr(jfin that in 
light of the state action requirement of section l985(3)'s companion 
provision, section 1983, imposing a similar requirement on section 
1985(3) would make that section redundant and superfluous.43 
Therefore, as the dissenters fully recognize, the Court must re-ex-
amine not merely the intent of the drafters of section 1985(3), but 
also the Forty-Second Congress' view of its constitutional authority 
in 1871 to reach private conduct under the fourteenth amendment.44 
Thus, it appears that the question the Court managed to avoid in 
Gr(jfin, namely whether the fourteenth amendment can ever be a ba-
sis for legislation regulating private discrimination, begs to be 
squarely addressed in order to reconcile the requirements of section 
1985(3) and 1983. 
In at least one case, United States v. Guest, 45 six justices believed 
ond Congress, accustomed to a narrow construction of the Commerce Clause and 
seeking to reach that denied equality whether or not interstate commerce was impli-
cated. never considered the Commerce Clause as its authority. (footnotes omitted). 
Sco/1 v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 1029-30. 
41. See, e.g., The Civr1 Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) which held the public accomoda-
tions provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional because the fourteenth amend-
ment does not apply to the wrongful acts of private individuals in the absence of some state 
support. The Supreme Court continues to cite the Civil Right Cases for the proposition that the 
fourteenth amendment's self-executing impact extends only to state action and consequently 
does not reach private discrimination, even though notions of what constitutes state action 
have expanded considerably since 1883. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) 
(holding a state initiative prohibiting the regulation by government of the sale or rental of real 
property invalid because it "encouraged" private discrimination); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that exclusion based solely on race from a restau-
rant located in an off-street automobile parking building owned and operated by an agency of 
the state but leased to private persons constituted significant state contacts to be deemed state 
action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private enterprises which perform essentially 
"public functions" will be treated as a state for the purposes of applying constitutional 
guarantees). 
42. Sco/1, 103 S. Ct. at 3358. The Court based its conclusion on the fact that the right 
asserted in Scoll, the first amendment, only prohibits governmental action and thus to make 
out a case under section 1985(3) it was necessary to demonstrate some state involvement in the 
conspiracy. Jd 
43. 103 S. Ct. at 3362 citing Gr!f!in, 403 U.S. 563 (1968). 
44. Jd 103 S. Ct. at 3362 n.3. 
45. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Defendants, private citizens, were in-
dicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the criminal counterpart to section 1985(3), for conspiring to 
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in varying degrees that section five of the fourteenth amendment 
could be used to regulate private discrimination in the absence of 
state involvement.46 However, Justice Stevens, in his concurring 
opinion in Novotny, suggested that the fourteenth amendment re-
quires state presence, although the degree of state involvement is 
something less than traditional state action and does not have to be 
part of the conspiracy itselfY Prior to Scott the circuit courts faced 
with this issue were divided over the state action requirement, the 
Seventh Circuit adopting Justice Stevens' position,48 the Fourth Cir-
cuit requiring traditional state action;49 and the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits reading Gr!ffin as construing section 1985(3) to reach both 
the public and private deprivations of constitutional rights.5° Fol-
lowing the Court's decision in Scott, the continued viability of the 
deprive black citizens of the free exercise and enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. 
46. Id at 755-56, 761-62 (Clark, J., joined by Black and Fortas, JJ., concurring); 777-81 
(Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795-96 (1966); United States v. Williams, 
341 U.S. 70 (1951). 
47. Novotny, 442 U.S. 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Note also that Justice Stevens 
conceded that no state involvement is required for private conspiracies to deprive individuals 
of either their right to travel or their right to be free of badges and incidents of slavery, but 
argued that recovery for equal protection violations occurs only when state action is present. 
Id at 383-85. For a discussion of what Justice Stevens meant by state action see infra notes 
55-58 and accompanying text. 
48. Cohen v. Illinois lnst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Dombrowski v. 
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). The opinions in both of these cases were written by 
Justice Stevens, then a member of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Schneider v. 
Bahler, slip op. No. 18-310 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 1983) adamantly reaffirmed Dombrowski and 
cited Justice Stevens' concurrence in Novotny as support for the state action requirement where 
the fourteenth amendment was involved. 
49. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 
Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). More recently see Nutt v. Duke Precision Dental & Ortho-
dontic Lab, 698 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1983), reaffirming Doski. For a discussion of state 
action, see supra note 41. 
50. The Eighth Circuit holds that the fourteenth amendment protects certain rights from 
both state and private infringements. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en 
bane) (first amendment freedom of religion); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(right to vote in state or tribal elections). Prior to Sco/1 the Fifth Circuit, based upon its 
decision in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane) 
said the conspiracy alleged under§ 1985(3) must be ''to deprive another of the enjoyment of 
legal rights by independently unlawful conduct." 545 F.2d at 927. McLellan cited United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) as authority for the proposition that a private party can 
deprive another of equal protection of the laws by committing some civil or criminal offense 
against the party seeking relief under§ 1985(3). 106 U.S. at 295. The Fifth Circuit felt that 
such a construction "limited the potentially boundless reach of[§ 1985(3)] ... and provided 
meaning to the concept of private impairment of constitutional rights." Scott v. Moore, 640 
F.2d 708, 718 (5th Cir. 1981). 
HeinOnline -- 27 Howard L.J. 1508 1984
1508 HOI£4RD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27 
decisions on section 1985(3) from the Eighth and Fifth Circuits are 
now in question. 
The Court's decision in Scott is consistent with Justice Stevens' 
position in Novotny and the position taken by the other lower federal 
courts since Novotny. With the exception of the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, the remainder require some form of state action for invoca-
tion of the first and/or fourteenth amendments. 51 The problems 
these courts faced centered around explaining what constitutes state 
action. Arguably the majority in Scott appears to adopt the Seventh 
Circuit's more relaxed position on the state action question citing 
.Dombrowski v. Dow/ing52 and Murphy v. Mount Carmel High 
Schoo/.53 Whether this means that the majority in Scott has also 
51. See, e.g., Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1982) (a sex discrimina-
tion suit in which the court in dismissing held that the fourteenth amendment requires that 
some state action and sex discrimination suits could not be based on the thirteenth amend-
ment); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 553 F. Supp. 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (court held that if section 
1985(3) action is based upon the fourteenth amendment, then there must be state action. The 
court did not, however, define state action). Cf. People v. Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 
1982) the Court of Appeals citing McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 
(5th Cir. 1977) held that where a private conspiracy hindered the state "from carrying out its 
chosen means of securing substantive rights" this constitutes a fourteenth amendment viola-
tion and gave the stare a cause of action under section 1985(3). 676 F.2d at 41-42. The Third 
Circuit in Dogin v. Beralem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980) implied a state action 
requirement for 1985(3) claims invoking the fourteenth amendment. A district court in Daley 
v. Saint Agnes Hospital, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309 (E. D. Pa. 1980), in a case factually similar to 
Novotny, held on the issue of remedying private conspiracies invoking the fourteenth amend-
ment that "it would be unsound for a federal court absent clear guidance from the Supreme 
Court, to decide this complex question by holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
empowers Congress to reach purely private conspiracies to violate First Amendment rights." 
490 F. Supp. at 1319. In Nash v. City of Oakwood, Ohio, 94 F.R.D. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1982) the 
court avoided a direct ruling on state action since § 1983 was invoked. q: Taylor v. Gilmar-
tin, 686 F.2d 1346 (lOth Cir. 1982) an adult plaintiff sued religious deprogrammers and sought 
recovery under section 1985(3) claiming denial of the fourteenth amendment guarantee to 
equal protection, due process, and freedom of religion and association through the wrongful 
use of the sheriff's office in Oklahoma. The court of appeals found that there was "state ac-
tion", thus logically implying a state action requirement because the private parties conspired 
to cause the sheriff's office to violate the aforementioned constitutionally protected rights. The 
appellate court held that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment can be a congressional source of 
power to remedy actions by private parties to induce the state to deprive individuals of first or 
fourteenth amendment rights. 686 F.2d at 1348-50. 
52. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). In Dombrowski a white crimi-
nal lawyer was denied rental space in an office building because of a belief that a large number 
of his clients would be black. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that discrimi-
nation by the landlord did not violate one's civil rights absent a showing of state involvement. 
ld at 196. 
53. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976). In Mr. Carmel 
a tenured teacher at a privately operated high school was dismissed for failing to adhere to the 
school's recently enacted dress code. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
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accepted the Seventh Circuit's definition of state action is unclear. 
The dissenting opinion in Scott suggests that the majority has.54 
In the Seventh Circuit, the state action required in a section 
1985(3) case goes to the right asserted. For example, in Cohen v. 
Illinois Institute of Technology, 55 the court in an opinion written by 
Justice Stevens, then a member of that court, said "there is no statu-
tory requirement for state participation in or support of the conduct 
of the individual conspirators proscribed by section 1985(3). There 
is, however, a requirement that the conspiracy deprive plaintiffs of a 
federally protected right."56 The court went on to say that "[i]t is 
clear that a private conspiracy to cause plaintiff to receive unequal 
treatment from the state, or a state agency, would violate section 
1985(3)."57 In Dombrowski, the court, in another Stevens authored 
opinion, wrote that the state involvement required under section 
1985(3) goes to the "nature of the plaintiff's rights" being asserted 
since only some rights are protected from state infringement. 58 
Thus, if the Supreme Court fully adopts the Dombrowski rationale, 
section 1985(3) actions invoking fourteenth amendment rights would 
have to show some state involvement, but this involvement is not as 
stringent as traditional notions of state action. However, this ap-
proach while preferable to the more stringent traditional state action 
requirement, still does not eliminate the overlap between sections 
1985(3) and 1983. 
The other alternative suggested by the dissenters in Scott, 
namely a more liberal reading of the fourteenth amendment to cover 
private conspiracies without any state involvement, would probably 
create more problems for the Court than are created by a relaxation 
§ 1985(3) cannot be used to remedy a purely private conspiracy to interfere with freedom of 
expression without state involvement. /d. at 1192. 
54. Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3361 n.2. For the Seventh Circuit's definition of state action see 
infra notes 55-58 and .accompanying text. 
/d. 
55. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975). 
56. /d. at 829-30. 
57. /d. at 828 n.27 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)). 
58. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 194 (1972). The court in Pombrowski indicated that: 
The breadth of the statute's [§ 1985(3)] coverage is yet to be determined, but three 
categories of protected rights have been plainly identified. Griffin gives express rec-
ognition to a black citizen's Thirteenth Amendment Rights ana to hts federal right to 
travel interstate; the title of the statute expressly identifies the third category, namely 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Footnotes omitted). 
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of the state action requirements.59 The dissenters' position requires a 
reinterpretation of the fourteenth amendment60 which, even if lim-
ited to instances where a denial of equal protection or equal privi-
leges and immunities is claimed, would generate a wealth of 
unwanted litigation for the Court.61 Therefore, the Court's decision 
in Scott suggests that a bare majority favor some relaxation of state 
action requirements in section 1985(3) actions invoking fourteenth 
amendment rights rather than risk any reinterpretation of that 
amendment's coverage. It is doubtful that it can do so satisfactorily 
without reconciling the rapidly fading distinction between sections 
1983 and 1985(3). 
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE PERHIPHERY OF 
SECTION 1985(3) 
Of all of the possible constitutional sources for Congress' au-
thority to enact section 1985(3), reliance on the commerce clause 
would give the statute its broadest reach since it is well settled that 
Congress can regulate private discriminatory acts under that 
clause.62 However, as mentioned earlier,63 to do this a majority of 
the Court would have to be willing to ignore both the original intent 
of the drafters of section 1985(3) and the Forty-Second Congress' 
59. Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3362-65. For example, the class protected under the fourteenth 
amendment would include all persons discriminated against, as a class, in such a way as to 
deny equal protection of the laws. Such an interpretation would greatly expand the classes of 
persons oovered by section 1985(3). See supra note 25. The Court had a similar experience 
with section 1983. For a discussion of the Court's dissatisfaction with section 1983 actions. see 
generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 5. Increasing the classes of persons enti-
tled to use section 1985(3) to remedy civil rights violations would no doubt result in a flood of 
litigation further clogging an already over crowded federal court docket. 
60. Justice Blackmun acknowledges that his contention that state action is not required is 
inconsistent with "current interpretations of the First or Fourteenth Amendments." Scott, 103 
S. Ct., at 3362 n.3. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court has 
consistently since the Civil Rights Cases held that state action was required to state a cause of 
action under the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Justice 
Blackmun contends that the Court should follow the intent of the drafters of section 1985(3) 
because they believed that Congress could oonstitutionally legislate against private discrimina-
tion. Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3362-65. 
61. See supra note 59. 
62. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964); Great American Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. 
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). 
63. See supra note 39-40. 
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understanding of the scope of the commerce clause.64 Reliance on 
the commerce clause approach would be a more radical departure 
from traditional notions of statutory interpretation than relaxation of 
state action requirements under the fourteenth amendment because 
of the Forty-Second Congress' view of its commerce power.65 But 
there is judicial precedent for such reinterpretation.66 
64. The drafters', as Justice Blackmun suggests in his dissent in Scoll, intended to assert 
the fourteenth amendment as Congress' constitutional basis for enacting section 1985(3). See 
Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3362-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cites the following in 
support of this contention: CoN G. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. !53 (April 4, 1871) (re-
marks of Rep. Garfield); ld at 486 {April 5, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Cook); See also Comment, 
A Construction of Section 1985(c). supra note 4, at 412-420 (1979). 
65. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964). But cf 
language in this same case that suggests that Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause was as broad in 1871 as it is today. ld 253-261. Thus, Justice Blackmun correctly 
notes in Scott that the Court is confusing statutory construction with constitutional interpreta-
tion. 103 S. Ct. at 3362 n.3. 
ld 
(T)he two questions are separate. Determining the scope of§ 1985(3) is a matter of 
statutory construction and bas nothing to do with current interpretations of the First 
or Fourteenth Amendments. The Forty-Second Congress' view of its constitutional 
authority in 1871 to reach private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment is rele· 
vant in mterpreting the reach of§ 1985(3). 
66. E.g., the Court in the Civil Rights Cases originally adopted a very narrow view of 
Congress' authority under the thirteenth amendment to reach private discrimination. The 
Court while concluding that the thirteenth amendment gave Congress the authority to reach 
private conduct, went on to state that the amendment only prohibited imposition of "badges 
and incidents of slavery." 109 U.S. at 20-25 (1883). As one commentator noted, the effect of 
this decision was to preclude the application of§ 1985(3) to private actions unrelated to slav-
ery. See, Private Conspiracies To Violate Civil Rights, supra note 10, at 1008. This view 
changed substantially a century later when the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409, 440 ( 1968) concluded that Congress had the power under the thirteenth amendment 
"to determine what are badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation," even where it reached private discriminatory conduct. 
In Jones petitioners, relying in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1982 sued because respondents had 
refused to sell them a home based solely on race. The Court held "that § 1982 bars all racial 
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property and that the statute, 
thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amend· 
ment." Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. The Court "distinguished" the Civil Rights Case supra note 6 
saying that whatever the merits of the majority's rationale in the case, the enactment of Title II 
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 supra note 37 and the decisions in Heart of Atlanta and Me· 
C/ung,supra note 38, made the matter academic. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. Further, the 
Court overruled that portion of Hodges v. United Sta1es, 203 U.S. I (1906) which said that 
Congress' authority under the thirteenth amendment was limited to reaching conduct that ac· 
tually enslaves. See 203 U.S. at I. 
The Court in Guest has already established the ground work for a similar transfer of 
authority with respect to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 
I acknowledge that some of the decisions of this Court, most notably an aspect of the 
Civil RilU!ts Cases (citation omitted) ... have declared that Congress' power under 
§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is confined to the adoption of'appropriate legis-
lation for correcting the effects of ... prohibited State laws and State acts ... .' and 
a majority of the Court today rejects-this interpretation of§ 5. 
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The other constitutional bases for section 1985(3) cited by the 
Court have built in limitations.67 For example, actions using the 
thirteenth amendment are limited to (1) racially motivated acts that 
(2) constitute badges and incidents of slavery.68 Thus, the thirteenth 
amendment places severe limitations both on the persons and rights 
covered by section 1985(3): It could not, for example be asserted to 
remedy conspiracies aimed at gender-based discrimination. 
Although the Court in Griffin acknowledged that certain "rights 
and privileges of national citizenship [may be] assertable against pri-
vate as well as governmental interferences . . . ,"69 the Court has 
never clearly delineated these rights or determined which also apply 
against private interferences.7° Further, the thirteenth amendment 
does not cover conspiracies aimed at aliens. Therefore, this constitu-
tional basis of authority is much more limited than reliance on the 
fourteenth amendment using a relaxed state action standard. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the Court does not want to explore 
the possible use of the commerce clause as a constitutional basis for 
section 1985(3). Both the majority and the dissenters prefer to rely 
on other constitutional bases which are more consistent with the 
drafter's original intent, for section 1985(3) (thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments and right to travel). However, the Court ac-
knowledges the commerce power as a valid means of regulating 
private discrimination?' This preference appears consistent with the 
See Guest, 383 U.S. at 782-83. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
Brennan goes on to say: "Viewed in its proper perspective,§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion 
in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens." See Guest, 383 
U.S. at 784. 
67. See supra note 58 for the constitutional bases for § 1985(3) cited by the Court. 
68. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 439-44 (1968); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-25 
(1883). 
69. 403 U.S. at 105. 
70. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 
(1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1970); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
71. See Sco/1, 103 S. Ct. at 3358, 3366 n.l4. 
In the first place, it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any 
class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed 
their cause, most notably Republicans. The central theme of the bill's proponents 
was that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes 
and give them equal access to political power. 
!d. at 3359. But if. 
In my view Congress intended to provide a federal remedy for all classes that seek to 
exercise their legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims 
of Klan violence . . . . As Representative Garfield stated in the debates, the chief 
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Scott view that section 1985(3) was enacted to protect political rights 
as opposed to the broader notion of civil rights.72 
IV. THE NATURE OF SECTION 1985(3), NEITHER REMEDIAL NoR 
SUBSTANTIVE 
Discussions about the constitutional periphery of section 
1985(3) are mere academic exercises so long as the Court continues 
to consider it remedial. The characterization in Novotny of section 
1985(3) as remedial is without question the greatest limitation that 
the Court has placed on the statute.73 Requiring plaintiffs to invoke 
some independent right whose denial section 1985(3) is suppose to 
remedy practically emasculates the provision since most federal stat-
utory rights have their own exclusive administrative and judicial 
remedies and very few constitutional provisions apply against pri-
vate persons. Thus, the arguments over section l985(3)'s scope are 
not as crucial to its future use as the question of its nature. 
In that regard, Scott provides some hope since the four dissent-
ers, Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor suggest in a foot-
note that section 1985(3) can not be characterized as either remedial 
or substantive, but must be treated like most conspiracy statutes.74 
There is some legislative history to support this notion. During the 
1871 congressional debates Senator Edmunds, the senate manager of 
the bill that subsequently became known as the Ku Klux AcC5 said 
of section 2 (now section 1985(3)): 
The second section . . . only provides for the punishment of any 
act done in pursuance of the conspiracy, but only a conspiracy to 
deprive citizens of the United States, in the various ways named, 
of the rights which the Constitution and laws of the United States 
danger was 'a systematic maladministration of [the Jaws), or a neglect or refusal to 
enforce their provisions.' (citations omitted). 
ld, at 3367 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). 
Note that the majority opinion unlike Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion cited no legisla-
tive history to support its narrower view for the purpose for the enactment of section 1985(3). 
72. See supra note 71. 
73. 442 U.S. at 376. 
74. 103 S. Ct. at 3365 n.IO (Biackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion on how conspiracy 
statutes operate, see infra notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text. 
75. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Browden v. Tipton. 630 F.2d 1149, liS 1-52 
(6th Cir. 1980) and the Court in Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3360 refer to Senator Edmunds as the floor 
manager of the bill. George Edmunds, a Republican from Vermont, was one of the most 
outstanding radical New England constitutionalists. 
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made pursuant to it give to them; that is to say . . conspiracies to 
deprive people of the equal protection of the laws, whatever those 
laws may be ... It punishes the conspiracy alone, leaving the 
States, if they see fit, to punish the acts and crimes which may be 
committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. 76 
The conclusion can be drawn from these comments that Con-
gress intended to create a separate and independent cause of action 
that would not preclude existing state remedies. This conclusion is 
re-enforced by the legal understanding of conspiracy laws in 1871. 
At that time, civil conspiracy was virtually unknown, formal recog-
nition of such an action did not occur until the early I900's. 77 So 
conspiracy in the 1870's was criminal and viewed as a separate, sub-
stantive crime that did not merge with any crime perpetrated by the 
conspirators.78 Thus, Congress probably believed a civil conspiracy 
law would be an effective way the federal government could protect 
civil rights without overlapping or surplanting state authority since 
civil conspiracy at the state level was unknown in 1871. 
Footnote ten in the dissenting opinion in Scott 79 is a positive 
sign when read with Justice White's dissenting opinion,80 because 
there appear to be five members on the Court who are willing to 
reject the limiting characterization of section 1985(3) as a purely re-
76. CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (remarks of Senator Edmunds) (empha-
sis added). 
77. See, Burdick, Tlte Tort of Conspiracy, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 117, 119 (1908) citing BIGE-
LOW ON TORTS 24 (8th ed. 1907); see also Note, 22 L.Q. REv. 117 (1906) and Charlesworth, 
Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort, 36 L.Q. REv. 38 (1920). The tort of conspiracy 
began to be used by English judges during the latter part of the nineteenth century as a tool to 
oppress and harass labor groups. Comment, Reason by Analogy: Agency Principles Just([y Con-
spirator's Liability, [hereinafter cited as Comment]. 12 STAN. L. REv. 476, 477 n.3 (1960); 
Sayre, Labor and rite Courts, [hereinafter cited as Sayre]. 39 YALE L.J. 682, 686 (1930); COLE, 
THE BRITISH WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT, 292-96 (1948 ed.); WEBB AND WEBB, HISTORY OF 
TRADE UNIONISM, 597-604 (1965 ed.). Civil conspiracy was originally limited to instances 
where persons conspired to abuse legal process; see Comment, supra at 477. It has been ex-
panded today to include almost every conspiracy having an illegal object or persuing a legal 
object by illegal means. ld see Sayre, supra at 684. Some states had a writ of conspiracy, but 
it was limited to providing a statutory remedy for malicious prosecution. Burdick, Conspiracy 
as a Crime, and as a Tort, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 232 ( 1907) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy as 
a Crime];see also Mott v. Danford. 6 Watts 304 (Pa., 1837). Further, once civil conspiracy was 
recognized as an action, it was assumed to be substantive in nature. Conspiracy as a Crime, 
supra at 229. 
78. Conspiracy as a Crime, supra note 77 at 229. 
79. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
80. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 388-91. 
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medial statute.81 Removing the remedial label, however, would not 
make section 1985(3) a general tort conspiracy statute. If treated as a 
conspiracy statute there would still be sufficient pre-existing limita-
tions on section 1985(3) to avoid an unwarranted intrusion into state 
affairs. For example, plaintiffs would still have to demonstrate that 
the conspirators have some discriminatory class-based animus and 
that the aim of the conspiracy was to deprive a person or class of 
persons of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities of the 
law. 82 Thus, if the Court is truly committed to interpreting section 
1985(3) consistent with the intent and understanding of the 1871 
Congress, it must first remove the remedial label. 
V. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1985(3) 
As mentioned earlier, none of the Court's decisions interpreting 
section 1985(3) has resolved the question of its scope. The Court in 
Gr!ffin was silent whereas the Novotny court was divided.83 
Following Novotny, many courts citing that decision refused to 
allow section 1985(3) to be used to remedy violations of a federal 
statutory right. 84 There were, however, some post-Novotny decisions 
that refused to extend the Court's reasoning to other reconstruction 
era statutes.85 Finally, some courts suggested that the statute could 
81. Justice Blackmun and the three justices who joined in his dissent in Scoll, Brennan, 
Marshall and O'Connor, plus Justice White based on his dissent in Novotny, supra note 80. 
82. The basic requirements of a section 1985(3) action are set forth in Griffin, supra note 
23. 
83. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring). ld at 381-85 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) both of these justices favor limiting the scope of section 1985(3) to constitutional viola· 
tions. But cj. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 391-96 (White, J., dissenting) Justice White, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall urged that section 1985(3) be applied to all rights guaranteed 
by federal statutes. 
84. Staithos v. Bouden, 514 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that a constitutional 
violation would support a § 1985(3) claim), Winty v. Port Authority, 551 F. Supp. 1323 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (held§ 1985(3) not available to remedy a Title VII violation and only appro-
priate if "the employment discrimination violates the Constitution.") ld at 1325; Purtill v. 
Harris, 658 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981) (age discrimination in Employment Act held closely analo· 
gous to Title VII and thus not coextensive with § 1985(3)); see also Anderson v. Thompson, 
658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) (although plaintiffs used§ 1983 to challenge the Education of All 
Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16), the court of appeals looked to Novotny and 
its treatment of§ 1985(3) in conjunction with Title VII and found "an elaborate administrative 
and judicial enforcement system" evidencing a Congressional intent to have the Act as an 
exclusive remedy). ld at 1216. 
85. Goffv. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982) (the court refused to extend 
Novotny to§ 1981 claiming it did contain substantive rights); Herebschen v. Department of 
Health and Social Services, 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.O. Wise. 1982) (the court refused to extend 
HeinOnline -- 27 Howard L.J. 1516 1984
1516 HOIDIRD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27 
be used to remedy a federal statutory violation but failed to specifi-
cally indicate which ones.86 But overall, Novotny has had a chilling 
effect on attempts to use section 1985(3) with federal statutes. How-
ever, Justice White's statement in his dissenting opinion in Novotny 
that section 1985(3) may be used to remedy violations of federal stat-
utory rights provides some glimmer of hope that the statute's cover-
age will be expanded. 87 
Further, Justice White's majority opinion in Scott suggests that 
he still believes section 1985(3) can be used to remedy some federal 
statutory rights.88 He also suggests that the discriminatory animus 
requirement set forth in Griffin could be something other than a ra-
cially motivated one. 89 His discussion of this second issue strongly 
suggests that he rejects the narrower interpretation of section 
1985(3)'s purpose, or at the very least asserts that the Court in Gr(ffin, 
Novotny and now in Scott has not squarely addressed this 
question.90 
The dissenters in Scott while criticizing the majority's very re-
strictive interpretation of the scope of section 1985(3) are silent on 
the question of the statute's application to federal statutory rights.91 
Novotny to bar use of § 1983 in a Title VII suit to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages). 
86. Ragin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980) (the court said that 
§ 1985(3) could be used with other federal statutes, but did not identify them); People v. 
Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982) (the court said that§ 1985(3) could be used to rem-
edy violations of both federal and state rights, here the New York Human Rights law); Daley 
v. Saint Agnes Hosp., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309 (E. D. Pa. 1980) (here the plaintiff attempted to 
use § 1985(3) to remedy a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but the court without 
passing on the scope of§ 1985(3) ruled that the plaintiff alleged insufficient facts to show a 
violation). 
87. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 391-96. 
88. Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3358. 
Because of that holding the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine 
whether respondent's action could be sustained under § 1985(3) as involving a con-
spiracy to deprive respondents of rights, privileges, or immunities under state law or 
those protected against private action by the Federal Constitutional or ftderol statu-
tory/ow. 
Id. [emphasis added] 
89. "In the first place, it is a close question whether§ 1985(3) was intended to reach any 
class-based animus other than an animus against Negroes and those who championed their 
case, most notably Republicans." /d. at 3359. 
90. /d. at 3359-60. For a discussion of the views about section 1985(3)'s purpose see supra 
note 71. 
91. ''The Court assumes that § 1985(3) merely bans private conspiracies to accomplish 
deprivations that are actionable under § 1983 when caused by state officials. Although Con-
gress could have passed such as statute, the simple fact is that it did not." 103 S. Ct. at 3361-62. 
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One reason for their silence might be because the facts of Scott do 
not specifically address this issue. However, a more realistic expla-
nation might be that they did not agree on this issue and thus did not 
address it. Still another reason for the silence is probably due in part 
to the Court's holding in Novotny that section 1985(3) is not co-ex-
tensive with Title VII nor arguably any statute with its own adminis-
trative remedies.92 Thus, the Court still has not resolved the 
question. 
On the other hand, one way of resolving some of the aforemen-
tioned problems with section 1985(3) actions would be to narrowly 
define the scope of such actions. At least one commentator suggests 
limiting section 1985(3) actions to private conspiracies aimed at in-
terfering with or disrupting the ability of government to politically 
carry out its functions. 93 He contends that this was the original pur-
pose of the statute, but asserts that some courts and commentators 
have erroneously viewed the Ku Klux Act as a general anti-discrimi-
nation statute applying it to a broad range of inequalities never in-
tended by the drafters of the act.94 This is an extremely restrictive 
view of section 1985(3) but arguably, as the commentator points out, 
such an interpretation would minimize potential federalism 
problems95 and bar use of the statute as a remedy for infringements 
of federal statutory rights.96 Also, this approach would be consistent 
with the factual situation in Gr!ffin and may be used to explain the 
contrary results in Novotny and Scott .97 However, such a restrictive 
view of section 1985(3) seems to be inconsistent with the spirit of the 
1871 Congress. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Scott, Justice White concludes the majority opinion with the 
following statement: 
92. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378. 
93. Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(3), supra note 4, at 436. 
94. /d. at 427. 
95. See Gr(ffin, 403 U.S; at 102 where the Coun in adding the requirement of some dis-
criminatory animus speaks of avoiding .. the shoals that would like in the path of interpreting 
§ 1985(3) as a general federal ton law .... " /d. 
96. Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c), supra note 4, at 429, 430. 
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Even the Court in Gr(ffin stated that the fact 
situation of the case fit squarely within the situation that Congress intended to remedy. 403 
U.S. at 103. 
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If we have misconstrued the intent of the 1871 Congress, or, in any 
event, if Congress now prefers to take a different task, the Court 
will, of course, enforce any statute within the power of Congress to 
enact.98 
Perhaps Justice White realizes that the Court is not prepared now or 
ever to resolve the questions about section 1985(3) constitutional pe-
riphery, nature and scope. The Court has acknowledged that Con-
gress now has the constitutional authority under the commerce 
clause to reach purely private actions. Thus, Justice White seems to 
be asking Congress to resolve these issues by either enacting new 
legislation or by its inaction let section 1985(3) return to oblivion in 
light of the Court's restrictive stance. As things stand now, unfortu-
nately, the latter is more likely than the former. 
98. Scoll, 103 S. Ct. at 3361. 
